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Abstract This paper presents and discusses a novel approach to in-
deterministic belief revision. An indeterministic belief revision operator
assumes that, when an agent is confronted with a new piece of infor-
mation, it can revise its belief sets in more than one way. We define a
rational agent not only in terms of what it believes but also of what it
desires and wants to achieve. Hence, we propose that the agent’s goals
play a role in the choice of (possibly) one of the several available revi-
sion options. Properties of the new belief revision mechanism are also
investigated.
Keywords. Rational agents, indeterministic belief revision, qualitative
decision theory.
1 Motivating example
Suppose that you believe that:
1. A liberal policy leads to decrease of unemployment, and
2. A decrease of unemployment leads to re-election,
and you desire to be re-elected. Therefore you execute a plan based on a liberal
policy, or do something else to decrease unemployment, and secure your re-
election.
Now suppose that someone informs you that a liberal policy does not lead to
re-election. Assume the person telling you this is very trustworthy, has a good
reputation, so you believe what he is telling you. This implies that the three
beliefs cannot hold together, and you have to give up one of them.
Now assume in addition that when you give up your belief in the first rule,
you still have another plan to decrease unemployment, and thus to be re-elected,
for example by increasing government spending on public works like building
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bridges. However, if you give up your second belief that lower unemployment
leads to re-election, you do not have an alternative plan to achieve re-election.
In that case, you might reason by cases as follows.
1. Let us first assume that the first belief that liberal policy leads to lower
unemployment is factually wrong, whereas the second belief is true. If you
choose to retain the first (wrong) belief and to reject the second one, then you
will do nothing and you will not succeed in being re-elected. But, had you
kept your belief in the second rule and rejected the first belief, you could have
increased public spending in order to decrease unemployment, and therefore
you could have achieved your goal to be re-elected. To conclude, choosing to
maintain the first belief, you risk to miss a goal you could have achieved.
2. Let us now assume assume that the first belief is actually true and the second
belief is wrong. If you choose to keep the second (wrong) belief that decreas-
ing unemployment leads to re-election, you will increase public spending,
but you will not achieve the goal of being re-elected. However, even if you
had chosen the right revision, i.e. to retain the first belief and reject the sec-
ond one, you could have not achieved your goal of re-election. To conclude,
by choosing the second (wrong) rule, you believed you could achieve a goal
when you could not, so you will be disappointed for trying in vain but at
least you tried to reach your aim.
The moral of the story is that, if you are interested only in realizing your goal
(and there are no other goals relevant for you), then choosing the second belief
— even when it is factually wrong — is the only rational choice. This is because,
independently of the second belief being right or wrong, by choosing that belief
you will end up in an optimal state. Moreover, in one situation — the first one
— you will end up in a better state if you choose the second belief than if you
choose the first one. Summarizing, you should drop the first belief, because in
that way, you keep open all possibilities to achieve your goal.
We can formalize the above example, by defining the following atomic propo-
sitions:
p you are following a liberal policy;
u unemployment decreases;
r you will be re-elected;
s you are increasing public spending.
The belief base before being told that a liberal policy does not lead to re-election
(¬(p ⊃ r)) would contain the three formulas p ⊃ u, u ⊃ r, and s ⊃ u. You desire,
first of all, to be re-elected, r, and, if possible, not to increase public spending,
¬s. Adding ¬(p ⊃ r) to your beliefs would make them inconsistent. Therefore,
you have to revise your beliefs by giving up either p ⊃ u or u ⊃ r. The choice
you make may depend on the goals you can achieve in the alternatives: if you
give up p ⊃ u, your plan will be to increase public spending, so you will not
achieve ¬s, but might succeed in achieving r; if you give up u ⊃ r, your plan
will be to do nothing, so you will certainly not achieve r, but you will fulfill ¬s.
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Depending on the payoff you expect from r and ¬s, you could prefer one or the
other alternative.
We use the re-election example as a running example throughout the paper.
There are some particular issues involved in the re-election situation, such as
temporal references. However, we believe that many problems can be phrased in a
similar way, including examples referring to factual statements about the present
state of the world rather than hypothetical statements referring to the future as
in the re-election example. For example, p may stand for “it is a public holiday”,
q for “your favorite restaurant is open”, r stands for “eating in the restaurant”,
and you are informed that the restaurant is closed on public holidays. In that
case, you would give up your belief that it is a public holiday, because that is
the only way to achieve your goal to eat in the restaurant. You may drive to
the restaurant in vain, but it would be much worse to give up the belief that
the restaurant is open, only to find out later that you could have eaten there.
At least, as long as we assume that this line of reasoning does not interfere with
other goals. For example, the goal not to drive to restaurants in vain should
not be preferred to the goal to eat in the restaurant, and there should not be
information that it is much more likely that it is a public holiday than that the
restaurant is open, and so on.
The choice among belief sets is distinct from other decision problems, due
to the possibility of wishful thinking. Consider for example that you desire that
liberal policy leads to lower unemployment, and that this desire is preferred to
the desire to be re-elected. What will you do? At least in a naive approach,
you could reason by cases as follows. Assume that you choose the first belief,
in that case you believe that will achieve the desire that liberal policy leads to
lower unemployment. Assume that you choose the second belief, in that case
you believe that you will achieve the goal to be re-elected. Since the first goal
is more important than the second one, you choose the first belief. Analogously,
in the restaurant example, if you like public holidays and this desire is stronger
than your desire to eat in the restaurant, than a naive reasoner may choose the
first belief set. However, this is again a case of wishful thinking, and not a valid
reason not to go to the restaurant. Instead, one should reason by cases as follows.
Either it is a public holiday or not. If it is a public holiday, it does not matter
what we do, we always achieve the goal that it is a public holiday and we never
achieve the goal to go to the restaurant, since it is closed. If it is not a public
holiday, then we will never achieve the desire for public holidays, but we may
achieve the desire to eat in the restaurant — at least, when we go there. Our
formal framework illustrates why the line of reasoning leading to the decision
not to go to the restaurant is fallacious.
The idea of this paper is inspired by the notion of conventional wisdom (CW)
as introduced by economist John Kenneth Galbraith:
We associate truth with convenience, with what most closely accords
with self-interest and personal well-being. ([14], p. 34)
That is, CW consists of “ideas that are convenient, appealing”. This is the
rationale for keeping them. One basic brick of CW could then be the fact that
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some ideas are maintained because they maximize the goals that the agents
(believe) they can achieve. This work may be seen as an initial attempt to
formally capture the concept of a CW agent. In the following we provide a
logical framework that models how a CW agent revises its beliefs.
The paper is structured as follows. In Section 2 we introduce the aim of this
paper, the used methodology and particular challenges encountered. In Section
3 we introduce the agent theory we use in our approach, and in Section 4 we
introduce an indeterministic belief change operator in this agent theory. In Sec-
tion 5 we define the choice among beliefs as a decision problem in the agent
theory. We conclude the paper by clarifying the relation of our proposal with
some existing work (Section 6) and with some final remarks and ideas for future
research (Section 7).
2 Aim, methodology and challenges
The research problem of this paper is to develop a formal model to reason about
the kind of choices among belief sets discussed in the previous section, and to
generalize the example above in case of additional beliefs, multiple goals with
preferences among them, conditional desires, a way to take violated goals into
account, and so on.
We use a combination of the framework of belief revision together with a
qualitative decision theory. Classical approaches to belief revision assume that,
when an agent revises its belief set in view of a new input, the outcome is
well-determined. This picture, however, is not realistic. When an agent revises
its beliefs in the light of some new fact, it often has more than one available
alternative. Approaches to belief revision that do not stipulate the existence of a
single revision option are called indeterministic [16,19]. In this paper we suggest
that one possible policy an agent can use in order to choose among available
alternatives is to check the effect of the different revisions on the agent’s set of
goals.
Moreover, for the qualitative decision theory we are inspired by agent theories
such as the BOID architecture [2], the framework of goal generation in 3APL as
developed by van Riemsdijk and colleagues [20], and [5]. In particular, our agent
model is based on one of the versions of 3APL, because the belief base in the
mental state of a 3APL agent is a consistent set of propositional sentences, just
like in the framework of belief revision. However, we do not include “planning
rules” or “practical reasoning rules” representing which action to choose in a
particular state, because we aim for a modular agent architecture. We assume
that there is a planning module, which would take a set of goals, actions, and an
initial world state representation in input and produce a solution plan in output.
This planning module might rely on the well-known graphplan algorithm, or any
other AI planner: as in object-oriented programming, we encapsulate the planner
within a well-defined interface and overlook the implementation details of how a
solution plan is found. This is in line with the BOID architecture [2], where the
planning component is kept separate from the remainder of agent deliberation.
Choosing Your Beliefs 5
In other words, we model the choice among belief sets essentially as a decision
problem, that is, as a choice among a set of alternatives. We do not use clas-
sical decision theory (utility function, probability distribution, and the decision
rule to maximize expected utility), but a qualitative version based on maximiz-
ing achieved goals and minimizing violated goals in an abstract agent theory
(see e.g. [8] for various approaches to formalize the decision process of what an
agent should do), because such qualitative decision theories include beliefs and
therefore are easier to combine with the theory of belief revision. However, what
precisely are the alternatives?
An indeterministic belief revision operator associates multiple revision op-
tions to a belief set that turns out to be inconsistent as a consequence of a new
piece of information. Our revision mechanism selects the revision alternative that
allows the agent to maximize its achievable goals. However, it will not always be
possible to select exactly one revision alternative. For example, there may be one
preferred goal set but two revision alternatives that lead the agent to achieve
it. In this case, the two belief revision candidates are said to be equivalent. In
Section 5.3 we will provide conditions under which a revision for a CW agent is
deterministic, that is, when our revision operator can select exactly one revision
alternative.
Besides the issue of wishful thinking, another complicating factor when choos-
ing among belief sets in the context of conditional desire rules, is that a max-
imization of goals may lead to a meta-goal to derive goals. However, deriving
goals by itself does not have to be desirable. In contrast, it may even be argued
that fewer goals is better than more goals, as you risk to violate goals and be-
come unhappy (as in Buddhism). One possible solution would be taking also
goal violations into account. However, we do not address this issue in this paper.
3 An abstract agent theory
In this section, we represent the formalism which is used throughout the paper.
3.1 A brief introduction to AI planning and agent theory
Any agent, be it biological or artificial, must possess knowledge of the environ-
ment it operates in, in the form of e.g. beliefs. Furthermore, a necessary condition
for an entity to be an agent is that it acts. We shall call the factors that moti-
vate an agent to act desires. For artificial agents, desires may be the purposes
an agent was created for.
Desires are necessary, not sufficient, conditions for action. When a desire is
met by other conditions that make it possible for an agent to act, that desire
becomes a goal.
The reasoning side of acting is known as practical reasoning or deliberation,
which may include planning. Planning is a process that chooses and organizes
actions by anticipating their expected effects with the purpose of achieving as
good as possible some pre-stated objectives or goals.
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Acting does not always imply planning. An agent deliberates or “chooses” to
plan when it has to make difficult or unusual tasks; or when there are high risks
or interests; or when there is the necessity of synchronizing several tasks which
are part of a dynamic system. Otherwise, its acting may be based on simple
stimulus-response rules.
Formally, AI planning may be defined as follows. Disposing of
(i) a representation of the initial state of the world I ;
(ii) a set A of actions; and
(iii) a description of the goals to be reached G ;
planning consists of finding a sequence of actions from A — plan — whose
execution, from the initial state I, leads to a final state in which G is satisfied.
Each action has a set of conditions it needs to be executed — preconditions— and
once executed, it produces one or more effects which changes the world from a
state to another. One of the theoretical motivations for planning is its utilization
as a component of the rational behavior of an agent. In this case, this is all about
providing the agent which has the task of constructing and/or executing a plan,
reasoning capabilities like being able to react according to its perceptions, i.e.,
according to the changes in its mental state (beliefs and desires). In this case,
planning consists in constructing a plan whose execution leads from the initial
state to a final state which satisfies the goals emerged during the planning process
or during the plan execution.
In the example, we may assume you dispose of two actions:
ap (implement a liberal policy), with no precondition, and with effect p;
as (increase public spending), with no precondition, and with effect s.
Our formalism is inspired by one of the variants of the agent programming
language 3APL used in [20]. However, unlike [20], the objective of our formalism
is to analyze, not to develop, agent systems. More precisely, our agent must single
out the best set of goals to be given as an input to a traditional planner. That is
because the intentions of the agent are not considered. We merely consider beliefs
(knowledge the agent has about the world states), desires (or motivations) and
relations (desire-adopting rules) defining how the desire base will change with
the acquisition of new beliefs and/or new desires. The goal generation process
that underlies this work is very much in line with the work carried out in [21]
on oversubscription planning problems, in which the main objective is to find
the maximal set of desires to be reached in a given period and with a limited
quantity of resources, and with goal generation in the BOID architecture [2].
3.2 Beliefs, Desires, and Goals
The basic components of our language are beliefs and desires. Beliefs are repre-
sented by means of a belief base. A belief base is a finite and consistent set of
propositional formulas describing the information the agent has about the world
and internal information. Desires are represented by means of a desire base. A
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desire base consists of a set of propositional formulas which represent the situ-
ations the agent would like to achieve. However, unlike the belief base, a desire
base may be inconsistent, e.g., {p,¬p}.
Definition 1 (Belief Base Σ and Desire Base Γ ) Let L be a propositional
language with > a tautology, and the logical connectives ∧ and ¬ with the usual
meaning. The agent’s belief base Σ is a consistent finite set of atomic propositions
like φ, ϕ, ψ, ... and compound propositions like ¬φ, ϕ ∧ ψ, and so on. Σ can
also be represented as the conjunction of its propositional formulas. The agent’s
desire base is a possibly inconsistent finite set of sentences denoted by Γ , with
Γ ⊆ L.
We use modal languages to talk about the belief and desire bases of the agent.
Since the belief and desire bases of an agent are completely separated, there is
no need to nest the operators B and D.
Definition 2 (Belief Formulas β and Desire Formulas κ) Given any for-
mula φ of L, Bφ means that φ is believed whereas Dφ means that φ is desired.
The languages of belief formulas β ∈ LB and desire formulas κ ∈ LD are defined
as follows:
β ::= >|Bφ|¬β|β1 ∧ β2
κ ::= >|Dφ|¬κ|κ1 ∧ κ2
Following van Riemsdijk and colleagues, the antecedent of a desire-adoption
rule consists of a belief condition and a desire condition; the consequent is a
propositional formula. Intuitively, this means that if the belief and the desire
conditions in the antecedent hold, the formula in the consequent is automatically
adopted as a desire. Note that this implies that in the antecedent we may have
for example a disjunction of two beliefs or a disjunction of two desires, but we
cannot have a disjunction of a belief and a desire.
Definition 3 (Desire-Adoption Rules RD) The language of desire-adoption
rules LR is defined as follows:
LR = {β, κ⇒+D φ | β ∈ LB , κ ∈ LD, φ ∈ L}
The set of desire-adoption rules RD of an agent is a finite subset of LR.
Goals, in contrast to desires, are represented by consistent desire bases. There
are various ways to generate candidate goal sets from the desire adoption rules,
as discussed in the remainder of this section.
Definition 4 (Candidate Goal Set Γ ∗) A candidate goal set Γ ∗ is a consis-
tent subset of Γ .
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3.3 Mental State Representation
We assume that an agent is equipped with three bases:
– belief base Σ ⊆ L;
– desire base: Γ ⊆ L;
– desire-adoption rule base RD;
The state of an agent is completely described by a triple S = 〈Σ,Γ,RD〉.
In addition, we assume that each agent can be described using a P-dependent
function FP , a pay-off function f : L → IR, a goal selection function G, and a
belief revision operator ∗, as discussed below.
In the example,
Σ = {¬(p ∧ ¬u),¬(u ∧ ¬r),¬(s ∧ ¬u)},
Γ = {r,¬s},
RD = {>,> ⇒+D r;>,> ⇒+D ¬s}.
The semantics we adopt for the belief formulas is standard.
Definition 5 (Semantics of Belief Formulas) Let φ ∈ L, β ∈ LB, and let
〈Σ,Γ,RD〉 be the mental state of an agent. The semantics of belief formulas is
given as
〈Σ,Γ,RD〉 |=LB >
〈Σ,Γ,RD〉 |=LB Bφ⇔ Σ |= φ
〈Σ,Γ,RD〉 |=LB ¬β ⇔ 〈Σ,Γ,RD〉 6|=LB β
〈Σ,Γ,RD〉 |=LB β1 ∧ β2 ⇔ 〈Σ,Γ,RD〉 |=LB β1 and 〈Σ,Γ,RD〉 |=LB β2
The semantics we adopt for desire formulas is similar to the semantics of goal
formulas proposed in [20].
Definition 6 (Semantics of Desire Formulas) Let φ ∈ L, κ ∈ LD, and let
〈Σ,Γ,RD〉 be the mental state of an agent. The semantics of desire formulas is
given as
〈Σ,Γ,RD〉 |=LD >
〈Σ,Γ,RD〉 |=LD Dφ⇔ ∃Γ ′ ⊆ Γ : (Γ ′ 6|= ⊥ andΓ ′ |= φ)
〈Σ,Γ,RD〉 |=LD ¬κ⇔ 〈Σ,Γ,RD〉 6|=LD κ
〈Σ,Γ,RD〉 |=LD κ1 ∧ κ2 ⇔ 〈Σ,Γ,RD〉 |=LD κ1 and 〈Σ,Γ,RD〉 |=LD κ2
We expect a rational agent to try and manipulate its surrounding environ-
ment to fulfill its goals. In general, given a planning problem P, not all goals can
be fulfilled. For example, if in the description of the problem there is no action
whose list of effects includes a goal, that goal will not be feasible. Hence, we
assume a P-dependent function FP that, given a belief base Σ and a goal set
Γ ∗, returns > if Γ ∗ is feasible and ⊥ otherwise.
Function FP obeys the following axioms:
Choosing Your Beliefs 9
1. for all Σ, FP(Σ, ∅) = > (an empty set of goals is always feasible);
2. for all Σ, Γ ∗1 , Γ
∗
2 , if Γ
∗
1 ⊆ Γ ∗2 ,
FP(Σ,Γ ∗1 ) = ⊥ ⇒ FP(Σ,Γ ∗2 ) = ⊥,
FP(Σ,Γ ∗2 ) = > ⇒ FP(Σ,Γ ∗1 ) = >
(goal set feasibility is monotonous).
In the example, where Σ = {¬(p ∧ ¬u),¬(u ∧ ¬r),¬(s ∧ ¬u)},
FP(Σ, ∅) = >,
FP(Σ, {r}) = >,
FP(Σ, {¬s}) = >,
FP(Σ, {r,¬s}) = >;
however, if we had Σ′ = {p ∧ ¬r,¬(u ∧ ¬r),¬(s ∧ ¬u)},
FP(Σ′, ∅) = >,
FP(Σ′, {r}) = ⊥,
FP(Σ′, {¬s}) = >,
FP(Σ′, {r,¬s}) = ⊥.
Definition 7 (Feasible Candidate Goal Set) A candidate goal set Γ ∗ is fea-
sible for a planning problem P if and only if FP(Σ,Γ ∗) = >.
3.4 Comparing Candidate Goals and Sets of Candidate Goals
In this section we define one possible way in which an agent can choose among
different sets of candidate goals. The particular choice made in this section is
meant to illustrate goal comparison in the agent theory. If this particular way
is replaced by another one, then still the general problem on choosing beliefs
holds, and our solution can be applied.
¿From a desire base Γ , several candidate goal sets Γ ∗i , 1 ≤ i ≤ n, may be
derived. How can an agent choose among all the possible Γ ∗i ? It is unrealistic to
assume that for a rational agent all goals have the same importance. Therefore,
we use the notion of expected pay-off to represent how relevant each goal is for
the agent. The idea is that a rational agent tries to choose a set of goals which,
first of all, is feasible and, secondly, gives the highest pay-off.
A pay-off function is a function f : L → IR which associates a real value (the
pay-off) to every formula in L. Given φ ∈ L, f(φ) is the pay-off the agent would
receive if φ were true. For all φ ∈ Γ , we assume that f(φ) > 0. In other words, a
rational agent cannot desire something that, if realized, would bring no benefit.
One problem with pay-offs is that an agent may not always be able to attach
a precise numerical value to its desires. An alternative approach would be to
assume a total order over an agent’s desires. In either case, we can define a total
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order º between goals, such that, for all φ1, φ2 ∈ L, φ1 º φ2 iff f(φ1) ≥ f(φ2),
or the agent desires φ1 at least as much as it desires φ2.
In the example, we could express the fact you want most of all to be reelected
and, if possible, would rather not increase public spending, by defining f(r) >
f(¬s), e.g., f(r) = 100, f(¬s) = 10. In case you find it unnatural to assign
arbitrary numerical values to these payoffs, you could just use a total order º,
and define r Â ¬s.
The º relation can be extended from candidate goals to sets of candidate
goals. For the qualitative ordering, we have that a goal set Γ ∗1 is preferred to
another one Γ ∗2 if, considering only the goals occurring in one of the sets, the
best goals are in Γ ∗1 or the worst goals are in Γ
∗
2 . Note that º is connected and
therefore a total pre-order, i.e., we always have Γ ∗1 º Γ ∗2 or Γ ∗2 º Γ ∗1 .
Definition 8 (Preference between Sets of Candidate Goals) Given two can-
didate goal sets Γ ∗1 and Γ
∗
2 :
– We say that Γ ∗1 is at least as preferred as Γ
∗
2 (denoted by Γ
∗
1 º Γ ∗2 ):∑
φ∈Γ∗1
f(φ) ≥
∑
φ∈Γ∗2
f(φ)
if the pay-offs are defined.
– If a preference relation over candidate goals is given, let Γ ′1 = Γ
∗
1 \ Γ ∗2 and
Γ ′2 = Γ
∗
2 \ Γ ∗1 . We then say that Γ ∗1 º Γ ∗2 iff one of the following two
conditions is satisfied:
1. ∀φ2 ∈ Γ ′2, ∃φ1 ∈ Γ ′1, s.t. φ1 º φ2;
2. ∀φ1 ∈ Γ ′1, ∃φ2 ∈ Γ ′2, such that φ1 º φ2.
In the example, it is easy to verify that the following relation holds in either
cases (if a payoff function is defined or if a preference order is used):
{r,¬s} Â {r} Â {¬s} Â ∅.
3.5 Defining the Goal Set Selection Function
In general, given a set of desires Γ , there may be many possible candidate goal
sets. A rational agent in state S = 〈Σ,Γ,RD〉 will select as the set of goals it
wants to pursue one precise candidate goal set Γ ∗ among the most preferred
feasible candidate goal sets, which depends on S.
Let us call G the function which maps a state S into the goal set selected by
a rational agent in state S: Γ ∗ = G(S).
In the example above, G(S) = {r,¬s}, because {r,¬s} is the most preferrable
among the feasible goal sets.
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4 Situating the Problem: Indeterministic Belief Change
“Most models of belief change are deterministic in the sense that given a
belief set and an input, the resulting belief set is well-determined. There
is no scope for chance in selecting the new belief set. Clearly, this is not
a realistic feature, but it makes the models much simpler and easier to
handle, not least from a computational point of view. In indeterministic
belief change, the subjection of a specified belief set to a specified input
has more than one admissible outcome.
Indeterministic operators can be constructed as sets of deterministic op-
erations. Hence, given n deterministic revision operators ∗1, ∗2, . . . , ∗n,
∗ = {∗1, ∗2, . . . , ∗n} can be used as an indeterministic operator.” [15]
Let us consider a belief set Σ and a new belief β. The revision of Σ in light
of a new belief β is simply:
Σ ∗ β ∈ {Σ ∗1 β,Σ ∗2 β, . . . Σ ∗n β}. (1)
More precisely, revising the belief set Σ with the indeterministic operator ∗
in light of new belief β leads to one of the n belief revision results:
Σ ∗ β ∈ {Σ1β , Σ2β , . . . Σnβ}, (2)
where Σiβ is the ith possible belief revision result.
Applying operator ∗ is then equivalent to applying one of the virtual oper-
ators ∗i contained in its definition. While the rationality of an agent does not
suggest any criterion to prefer one revision over the others, a defining feature of
a CW agent is that it will choose which revision to adopt based on the conse-
quence of that choice. One important consequence is the set of goals the agent
will decide to pursue.
In the example, β = B(p ∧ ¬r), and
Σ ∗ β ∈
{
Σ1β = {p ∧ ¬r,¬(u ∧ ¬r),¬(s ∧ ¬u)},
Σ2β = {p ∧ ¬r,¬(p ∧ ¬u),¬(s ∧ ¬u)}
}
. (3)
In the next sections we propose some possible ways to tackle the problem of
choosing one of the revision options among the different available.
5 Belief Revision as a Decision Problem
By considering an indeterministic belief revision, we admit Σ ∗ β to have more
than one possible result. In this case, the agent must select one among all pos-
sible revisions. Many criteria can be considered for selection. One of the criteria
is to choose the belief revision operator for which the goal set selection func-
tion returns the most preferrable goal set. In other words, selecting the revision
amounts to solve an optimization problem.
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5.1 Indeterministic State Change
The indeterminism of belief revision influences the desire-updating process. In
fact, the belief revision operator is just a part of the state-change operator,
which is indeterministic as well, as a consequence of the indeterminism of belief
revision. Therefore,
Sβ ∈ {S1β ,S2β , . . . ,Snβ }, (4)
where Siβ = 〈Σiβ , Γ iβ ,RD〉.
Which goal set is selected by an agent depends on G:
G(Sβ) ∈ {G(S1β), G(S2β), . . . , G(Snβ )}. (5)
In the example,
G(Sβ) ∈ {G(S1β), G(S2β)),
where G(S1β) = {r} and G(S2β) = {¬s}. The following table summarizes the
possibilities you may face when choosing between the two alternative revisions.
reality → 6|= p ⊃ u |= p ⊃ u
↓ beliefs |= u ⊃ r 6|= u ⊃ r
Σ1β r is achieved no desire
plan: increase ¬s is not achieved is achieved
public spending pay-off = f(r) pay-off = 0
Σ2β r is not achieved
¬s is achieved
plan: do nothing pay-off = f(¬s)
A traditional rational agent could not choose one of the G(Siβ) because they
are incomparable. Now, for a CW agent,
G(Sβ) ∈ PS{G(S1β), G(S2β), . . . , G(Snβ )}, (6)
where PS(S) denotes the preferred set of S defined as follows:
Definition 9 (Preferred Set PS) Given two sets S and X such that S ⊆ X,
and given a preference relation º over X, the preferred set of S is
PS(S) = {x ∈ S : ∀x′ ∈ S, x º x′}. (7)
Since in the example G(S1β) = {r} and G(S2β) = {¬s}, and {r} Â {¬s},
PS{G(S1β), G(S2β)} = PS{{r}, {¬s}} = {{r}}.
Therefore, a CW agent should choose revision Σ1β , because it is the only revision
whereby you could possibly end up being re-elected, which is what you desire
most. This is in agreement with the intuition underlying the motivating example.
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5.2 Choosing a Revision
As long as different revisions lead to distinct goal sets with different degrees of
preference, it is clear what revision a CW agent should choose. However, we can
distinguish two situations in which the choice is less trivial:
– there is just one preferred goal set Γ ∗, but more than one alternative options
lead to Γ ∗;
– there is no unique preferred goal set; that is, there are different goal sets
Γ ∗1 , . . . , Γ
∗
m, none of which is strictly preferred to the others, i.e., for all
i, j ∈ {1, . . . ,m}, Γ ∗i º Γ ∗j .
In these cases, some alternative belief revisions lead to equally preferred goal
sets, and such revisions may be regarded as equivalent.
Definition 10 (Equivalence between Belief Revision Candidates) A be-
lief revision candidate Σ1β is equivalent to another belief revision candidate Σ
2
β
(denoted by Σ1β ≈ Σ2β), if and only if G(S1β) º G(S2β) and G(S2β) º G(S1β).
It is easy to verify that ≈ is a standard equivalence relation, i.e., reflexive,
symmetric, and transitive.
The choice of which revision outcome to adopt may thus be deterministic
or indeterministic. It is indeterministic in the two cases presented above. More
precisely, the choice depends on the preference relations over the goal sets, which
determines the equivalence between revision candidates:
– if ‖PS{G(S1β), G(S2β), . . . , G(Snβ )}‖ = 1, i.e., the equivalent class of a pre-
ferred belief revision is a singleton and, if there is no i, j such that G(Siβ) =
G(Sjβ), the choice of the belief operator is obviously deterministic;
– if ‖PS{G(S1β), G(S2β), . . . , G(Snβ )}‖ = 1, and there is at least a couple i, j
such that G(Siβ) = G(Sjβ), the choice may be indeterministic, if two or
more distinct revisions lead to one and the most preferred goal set, but also
indifferent in practice.
– if ‖PS{G(S1β), G(S2β), . . . , G(Snβ )}‖ > 1, the choice is indeterministic;
It is important to notice that an agent that has to choose between Σiβ and
Σjβ which lead to the same goal set (as in the second case above) is in a dif-
ferent situation than an agent who has to randomly choose among a number of
competing revisions (as in the third case above). In the second case, whatever
the agent’s choice is, the goals are the same; in the third case, depending on the
agent’s choice, the goals the agent will pursue may vary. In general, a random
choice is hardly a rational option. But, when an agent is in the second situation,
it knows that, no matter which revision it chooses, the outcome does not change.
In such a context, a random choice becomes a rational option.
Proposition 1 Let ∗ be an indeterministic belief operator, and n be the number
of possible belief revisions candidate. We have:
1 ≤ ‖PS{G(S1β), G(S2β), . . . , G(Snβ )}‖ ≤ n.
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5.3 Conditions for Determinism of a CW Agent
Traditional indeterministic belief revision approaches allow for the result of be-
lief revision to be indeterminate in the sense that there may be many possible
revision alternatives that are equally rational. Our proposal builds on the idea
that what an agent wishes to achieve can play a role in the choice of which beliefs
to reject and which beliefs to retain. The example we have been using in this pa-
per also tries to capture the intuition that an agent who behaves in this manner
is rational. Our richer model can distinguish one revision alternative from the
other depending on the effect that each option has on the agent’s goal set. Hence,
under certain conditions, the choice among several revision alternatives can be
reduced to one. This is what we want to investigate now, that is we want to in-
vestigate the conditions under which a revision for a CW agent is deterministic
even if an indetermistic revision operator is used, i.e., ‖PS{G(Siβ)}i=1,...‖ = 1
and, for all i, j, G(Siβ) 6= G(Sjβ). Determinism may be desirable, for instance, in
agent programming, in those cases where predictability of the agent’s behaviour
is a requirement.
Observation 1 Σ ∗ β is deterministic in state S = 〈Σ,Γ,RD〉, iff no two al-
ternative revisions are equivalent, i.e., for all i, j, Σiβ 6≈ Σjβ.
Proposition 2 A sufficient condition for no two alternative revisions, Σiβ and
Σjβ, being equivalent is that
1. for all i, j, G(Siβ) 6= G(Sjβ);
2. (a) if pay-offs are defined, for all i, j,
∑
φ∈G(Siβ) f(φ) 6=
∑
φ∈G(Sjβ) f(φ);
(b) if pay-offs are not defined, the preference relation on goals is strict, i.e.,
for all φ, φ′ ∈ G(Sβ), φ 6= φ′, φ º φ′ ⇒ φ′ 6º φ.
Proof: If pay-offs are defined, from Hypothesis 1 and 2a, by applying Def-
inition 8, we obtain that either (G(Siβ) º G(Sjβ) and G(Sjβ) 6º G(Siβ)) or
(G(Sjβ) º G(Siβ) and G(Siβ) 6º G(Sjβ)). Therefore, Σiβ 6≈ Σjβ .
If pay-offs are not defined, from Hypothesis 1 and 2b, by applying Defini-
tion 8, we obtain again Σiβ 6≈ Σjβ .
Therefore, no two alternative revisions can be equivalent. ¤
Proposition 3 If the pay-off function f is such that, for all φ ∈ L, for all
Ψ ⊆ L \ {φ},
f(φ) 6=
∑
ψ∈Ψ
f(ψ), (8)
Condition 2a of Proposition 2 always holds.
The proof is trivial.
One might wonder how difficult it is to design a pay-off function that satisfies
Inequality 8. The answer is, quite easy.
Choosing Your Beliefs 15
Proposition 4 Given a rational, injective pay-off function f , there exists an-
other pay-off function fˆ such that
1. fˆ satisfies Inequality 8;
2. for any desired δ, for all φ ∈ L, |f(φ)− fˆ(φ)| < δ;
3. for all φ, ψ ∈ L, f(φ) > f(ψ)⇔ fˆ(φ) > fˆ(ψ).
Proof: Since f is rational, there exists u ∈ IR such that, for all φ ∈ L, f(φ) = n
for some integer n. Let
²0 < min{δ, u,min
φ∈L
f(φ)}.
We define a sequence {²i}i=0,... such that ²i+1 = ²i/2. It easy to verify that no
element ²i can be obtained as a sum of a finite number of other elements ²j , with
i 6= j. Now, let φ1, φ2, . . . an effective enumeration of all formulas in L (such
enumeration, which needs not be finite, exists for all recursively enumerable
languages); pay-off function fˆ may be defined, for all i = 1, 2, . . ., as
fˆ(φi) = f(φi) + ²i.
Function fˆ satisfies the three conditions of the thesis. ¤
6 Related work
6.1 Goal Change
In this paper we do not explain the process of goal generation and revision,
i.e., we are not interested in how new goals arise in the light of new beliefs or
desires. That aspect is considered, for example, in [5,6], where an approach has
been proposed to dynamically construct the goal set to be pursued by a rational
agent, by considering changes in its mental state. More precisely, the autors
propose a general framework based on classical propositional logic, to represent
changes in the mental state of the agent after the acquisition of new information
and/or after the arising of new desires.
An important point of this framework, which distinguishes it from the frame-
work used in this paper, is that the two aspects of how goals are selected by an
agent and how the selected goals are achieved are not conceptually separated:
this means, the goal selection mechanics depend on the planning process and then
interactions between these two aspects are a part of the goal generation/revision
process.
6.2 BOID
The BOID architecture [2] extends a classical planner with a component for
goal generation. In this goal generation component, there are subcomponents
for beliefs, obligations, intentions and desires [4]. The interaction among these
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subcomponents is studied using a qualitative decision theory [3,12] and qualita-
tive game theory [10] based on extensions of input/output logic [17,18,1]. using
merging operators [9], as an extension of the 3APL programming language [11],
and using defeasible logic [7]. Though in all of these approaches the relation be-
tween beliefs and goals plays a central role, in these papers the impact of goals
on the choice among belief sets has not been studied.
6.3 Preference over Beliefs
Doyle suggests to have a preference order over belief sets [13]. We have however
an indirect link from belief sets to feasible goals, and a preference order over these
goals; and from these preferences over goals, we again derive the preferences over
belief sets. Therefore, if one wanted to accept Doyle’s suggestion, our work could
be regarded as a method for deriving a rationally justified preference order over
belief sets.
7 Conclusions
We have presented some preliminary ideas for a new approach aiming at resolv-
ing indeterminism in belief revision. The framework has been inspired by the
concept of conventional wisdom, introduced by economist John Kenneth Gal-
braith. Revising a belief base with an indeterministic operator in light of a new
belief leads to more than one possible revisions. In this case, a traditional ratio-
nal agent would not be able to choose among the possible revision candidates.
The idea we started to develop is that the agent, in this case, may evaluate the
effects that the different revision options have on its goals. Therefore, it could
choose a revision which maximizes its goals. In other words, selecting the re-
vision would amount to solving an optimization problem. Finally, fundamental
definitions and properties of the belief revision mechanisms have been given.
Some topics for further research:
1. We would like to add a function V (S,G) that returns for a state together
with the feasible goals, the goals which also have been generated but which
are not feasible. Then we can define preferences not only over feasible goals
as now, but also over unfeasible ones.
Before doing so, we have to be clear about what we think goals are: achieve-
ment goals on events/punctual or maintenance goals on states/continuant?
In other words: if goals are events, then once you achieve them, you can
forget about them, like when you shoot at a target and you hit it; but if
goals can be states, like ”staying alive”, this does not hold anymore: it isn’t
because you believe you’re alive that you don’t want to stay alive anymore.
2. Assume that we have conflict between Bp and B¬p, and we can choose either
one of these beliefs, or none at all. What can we say about this situation?
Should we be more adventurous by believing either Bp or B¬p rather than
believing nothing, and if so, under which conditions? Consider for example
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the principle of goal generation that more information about beliefs leads to
more goals (monotony in beliefs for practical reasoning rules). In that case,
under suitable conditions, we can probably prove that we can ignore the
choice in which we do not believe anything.
3. Another open point of this work concerns the situation in which even if
we you consider preferences among goal sets, this would not be enough for
determining the belief revision to be adopted – belief revision process remains
indeterministic. In this case, it is necessary to provide a framework which
deals with this situation. One possibility would be to keep revision options
open waiting for a new input which help us to choose the more convenient
revision.
4. We can formalize the present model as an abstraction of a more general
model of decision making (e.g. taking inspiration from decision trees, Savage
style decision theory, action logics etc.) and consider the rationality of our
CW agent in this more general theory.
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